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GOOD NEWS INVESTORS!
YOU'VE GOT A FINANCIAL EXPERT
ON THE BOARD
THE BAD NEWS?
IT DOESN'T MEAN ANYTHING
Jeffrey M. McFarland*
I. INTRODUCTION
You do not have to be a big investor to be concerned about corporate
scandals like those involving Enron and WorldCom. The financial
shenanigans and misdeeds at those companies, and others, have shaken
investor confidence in the financial reporting process. It shook the
confidence of Congress, too.
In 2002, Congress swiftly passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley) to help restore investor confidence.' Among the
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley was section 407, which required reporting
companies to disclose in their annual proxy statements or annual reports
whether they had a "financial expert" on the audit committee of their board
of directors and required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to make rules to implement the provision.2 The goal of section 407, and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (Jacksonville, Florida); J.D.
1995, University of Florida College of Law. Professor McFarland gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of student Amanda L. Jack.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 790 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
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other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, was to improve the audit committee's
oversight of the financial reporting process.3
The SEC concluded its rulemaking regarding section 407 in early 2003,
and the rules became applicable to companies filing annual reports and
proxy statements for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2003.4 Most
companies have now done their second round of filings with the financial
expert rules in place. Based on the SEC's final rule-making and an
examination of a representative sample of those filings, this article
proposes modifications to the SEC's rules on audit committee financial
experts, including changes to the definition of an audit committee financial
expert and the duties, obligations and liabilities associated with being
designated as such.
Part I will serve as an overview of the role of the audit committee of
the board of directors and the increased legislative focus on that
committee.5 Part II will examine the SEC's requirements for "audit
committee financial experts" and its liability "safe harbor" for audit
committee financial experts.6 Part III will discuss how the companies
comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average,7 the Nasdaq 100 Composite
Index,8 and a representative sample of the Russell 2000 Index9 and Russell
Microcap Index 1° have designated, disclosed and compensated their audit
committee financial experts, based on their most recent SEC filings.
Finally, Part IV discusses the weaknesses of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's final rules on audit committee experts, and proposes
modifications.
3. Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46701, 2002 WL 31370458 (Oct. 22, 2002).
4. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47235, 79 S.E.C. Docket 1077, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (Jan. 24, 2003).
5. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 204, 301 and 407, 116
Stat. 773, 775, 790 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
6. Id. at § 407; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2005).
7. Component Weightings: Dow Jones Industrial Average, at http://djindexes.com/mdsidx
/index.cfm?event=showComponentWeights&rptsymbol=DJI&sitemapid=20 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2005).
8. Nasdaq 100 Index, at http://dynamic.nasdaq.com/dynamic/nasdaql00_activity.stm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005).
9. Russell 2000 Index Membership List, at http://www.cboe.com/products/R2000.pdf (as
of June 30, 2004). See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
10. Members: Russell Microcap Index, at http://russell.com/us/indexes/us/reconstitution
/microcap-adds.asp (as of June 24, 2005). See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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II. AUDIT COMMITTEES
Although audit committees have been around for decades, they began
to receive serious attention in the 1970s." Financial scandals and
misreporting pricked the ears of the SEC in the 1970s.' 2 It was not long
before the SEC began to enter into consent decrees with defendants
requiring audit committees to be established, 13 or, if already established,
better implemented. 14  Also, the SEC publicly recommended the use of
audit committees for better oversight of financial reporting, and a number
of corporate governance bills were proposed in Congress relating to
oversight of financial reporting. 15  As a result, the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and other self-regulatory organizations approved rules
requiring listed companies to form audit committees. 16
11. Special Committee on Audit Committees-American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, An AICP Requirement for Audit Committees: An Analysis of the Issues 4
(1978), available at http://www.aicpa.org/audcommctr/download/33_requir-audit-cmte.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
12. One of the most prominent collapses was Penn Central. For a description of its
demise, see Brian Trumbore, The Collapse of Penn Central, at
http://www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/
education/history/200 1/the.collapse.oLpenn-central.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
13. See S.E.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 74 Civ. 1185, 1974 WL 449 at *6 (D.D.C. October 1,
1974).
14. See, e.g., Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc.,
Relating to Activities of the Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 34-14380, 13 S.E.C. Docket 1393 (Jan. 16, 1978); S.E.C. v. Killeam
Props., Inc., No. TCA-75-67, 1977 WL 1065, at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. May 1977).
15. See Standing Audit Committee Composed of Outside Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-9548, 1972 WL 125505 (Mar. 23, 1972); Notice of Amendments to Require
Increased Disclosures of Relationships Between Registrants and Their Independent Public
Accountants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11147, 5 S.E.C. Docket 799 (Dec. 20, 1974);
Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation In the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally, Final Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-15384,
1978 WL 195744 (Dec. 6, 1978); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
25-26 (3d ed. 1998).
16. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-47654, 79 S.E.C. Docket 2876 (Apr. 9, 2003). The American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) also adopted a rule at the same time, but merely recommended that listed
companies have an audit committee comprised of independent directors. In the Matter of
American Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-16722, 19 S.E.C. Docket
1980 (Apr. 3, 1980). In 1991, AMEX adopted a rule requiring its listed companies to have
an audit committee comprised of a majority of independent directors. Self-Regulatory
Organizations; the American Stock Exchange; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and
Notice and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 Relating to
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In 1998, the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) sponsored a Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees ("Blue Ribbon Committee")
in response to concerns about earnings management. 7 After the Blue
Ribbon Committee released its report in 1999, the NYSE, the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASD followed with a new set of listing
standards requiring, among other things, that each member of the audit
committee be financially qualified in one manner or another. 18 The NYSE
imposed a financial literacy requirement on audit committee members and
required at least one member to have accounting or related financial
management expertise.' 9 The goal was to ensure that audit committee
members had a "basic understanding" of financial statements.20 Whether a
person met those requirements was left to the judgment of the board of
directors.2'
AMEX required the issuer to certify that its audit committee members
were able to read and understand basic financial statements, such as the
company's balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement.22
AMEX also required at least one member to have employment experience
in finance or accounting, professional certification in accounting, or
comparable experience or background that indicated the person's financial
sophistication, including experience as a chief executive officer, chief
Independent Directors and Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29796, 49
S.E.C. Docket 1492 (Oct. 8, 1991).
17. Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 2 (1999), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Blue Ribbon_Panel.pdf (last visited July 13, 2005).
18. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements and
Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2
Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42233, 71 S.E.C. Docket 639 (Dec. 14, 1999)
[hereinafter NYSE Amendment]; Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange LLC Amending the Exchange's
Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42232,
71 S.E.C. Docket 632 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter AMEX Amendment]; Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Amending its Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing
and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 Thereto,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-42231, 71 S.E.C. Docket 624 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter
NASD Amendment].
19. NYSE Amendment, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. AMEX Amendment, supra note 18.
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financial officer or other senior officer with financial oversight
responsibilities.23 The NASD rule for companies quoted on Nasdaq was
similar to the AMEX rule.24
The consequence of violating an exchange's listing standards is having
the corporation's securities de-listed from the applicable exchange or
system. A listing standards violation is not a violation of law. The SEC
followed with amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) to improve disclosure about the functioning of a
company's audit committee.25 The rules required the audit committee to
provide a report in the company's proxy statement stating the audit
committee had discussed the audit with management and the auditor,
received from the auditor disclosure about the auditor's independence, and
recommended to the board that the audit be included in the company's
annual report.26 The SEC did not require the audit committee to have a
charter, but if it had one, it was required to be included in the proxy
statement.
The SEC said these rules were not designed to increase liability for
audit committee members under state law.28 Nevertheless, the SEC did not
create a safe harbor to protect against private litigation. The SEC did not
expect the disclosure requirements would result in increased liability for
audit committee members under state law.29 In fact, the SEC indicated its
view that breaches of fiduciary duty litigation against audit committee
members would decline, since directors were likely to be more informed
under the new rules.3°
As the century turned, a new set of financial scandals motivated
Congress to adopt the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),
which consists of significant amendments to various portions of the
23. Id.
24. NASD Amendment, supra note 18.
25. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42266, 71 S.E.C. 787
(Dec. 22, 1999); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.306 (2005).
26. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42266, 71 S.E.C. 787
(Dec. 22, 1999); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.306 (2005).
27. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42266, 71 S.E.C. 787
(Dec. 22, 1999); Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(e)(3)(iii) (2005).
28. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42266, 71 S.E.C. 787
(Dec. 22, 1999).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Exchange Act.31 Sarbanes-Oxley incorporates audit committee legislation
directly into the Exchange Act, thereby subjecting some companies to the
audit committee rules that were not previously subject to the audit
committee rules of the NYSE, AMEX and NASD. 32  Under Sarbanes-
Oxley, the audit committee acquired the role of liaison between the public
accounting firm and the board of directors.33 The audit committee is
"directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of
the work" of any public accounting firm hired by the company to prepare
or issue the audit report.
34
In addition, section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that each reporting
company is required to disclose in its annual report or annual proxy
statement whether the audit committee has at least one "financial expert. 35
If a reporting company does not have a financial expert, it must explain
why. 36 Congress then directed the SEC to adopt rules to implement section
407, and it provided the SEC with guidance in determining whether a
person qualifies as a financial expert.37 The SEC was directed to do the
following:
(b) [C]onsider whether a person has, through education and experience as
a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer,
comptroller, or principal accounting officer of an issuer, or from a
position involving the performance of similar functions -
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements;
(2) experience in-
(A) the preparation of auditing of financial statements of generally
comparable issuers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting
for estimates, accruals and reserves;
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.); See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board
Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON CORPORATE
FIAscos AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds.) (2004).
32. Some companies are covered by the provisions of the Exchange Act but are not listed
on the NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301.
34. Id. Sarbanes-Oxley directed the national securities exchanges and national securities
associations to adopt listing rules complying with § 301.
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 407
36. Id.
37. Id.
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(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions. 38
The SEC then began the rulemaking process to implement section 407,
with the final rules to be in place by January 26, 2003.39
III. AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTS
A. DEFINING THE FINANCIAL EXPERT
Sarbanes-Oxley provides the SEC with parameters to determine
whether a director qualifies as a financial expert and directs the SEC to
promulgate rules to implement those requirements.4 ° On October 22, 2002,
the SEC issued its Proposed Rule (Proposed Rule) defining financial expert
for purposes of section 407.41 The Proposed Rule focused on a director's
actual experience with accounting matters at a public company that had
accounting issues similar to those for which the director was currently
serving.42 The definition required a person to have all of the following
attributes, which must have been gained through education and experience
as an accountant or auditor, or as a principal financial officer, controller or
principal accounting officer of an Exchange Act reporting company:
43
1. Understanding of GAAP and financial statements;
2. Experience applying GAAP to the types of accounting entries
comparable to those used by the company;
3. Experience preparing or auditing financial statements that present
accounting issues comparable to those faced at the company;
4. Experience with internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting; and
5. Understanding of audit committee functions.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46701, 2002 WL 31370458 (Oct. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Proposed Rule].
42. Id.
43. Id. In lieu of that experience, the Board could determine that the person gained the
experience in positions involving the performance of similar functions, or held positions that
would result in the person having similar expertise and experience.
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The decision about whether a person qualified under this definition of
"financial expert" was left to the business judgment of the board of
directors.44 To determine whether someone qualified as a financial expert,
the Proposed Rule required the board to evaluate ten factors:
* The level of financial education (advanced degree in finance or
accounting);
" Whether the person had been a certified public accountant, and for
how long;
* Whether the person was otherwise certified as having accounting
or financial experience by a private board that administers
standards and for how long;
* Whether the person served as a chief financial officer, controller or
principal accounting officer;
* The specific duties performed in past financial roles;
* The level of familiarity and experience with laws and regulations
applicable to preparation of financial statements;
* The level of direct experience preparing financial statements that
must be included in public reports;
" Past or current membership on one or more audit committees for
reporting companies;
* The level of familiarity and experience with the use and analysis of
financial statements of public companies; and
* Any other relevant qualifications or experience that would assist
him in understanding and evaluating financial information and
making knowledgeable and thorough inquiries about the integrity
of the financial reporting process.45
The SEC received over 200 comment letters in response to the
Proposed Rule.46 According to the SEC, investors generally supported the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47235, 79 S.E.C. Docket 1077 (Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Final Rule]. A fair number of the comment letters addressed sections 404 and 406 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, as opposed the financial expert rules in section 407. See, e.g., Letter from
Francis W. Holman, Jr., Vice President and Secretary, Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. to
SEC (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/manufact0
30403.htm. Also, many of the comment letters were submitted after the comment deadline
of November 29, 2002 stated in the Proposed Rule.
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proposals and in some cases thought additional disclosure would be
appropriate. 7  However, many commenters thought the disclosure
requirements went too far.4 8 Many of the public comments to the Proposed
Rule showed concern that the qualifications in the definition were too
narrow, 49 expressing the belief it would be too difficult for companies-
especially small ones-to attract an audit committee member that would
qualify as a financial expert.50 The comments further expressed concern
that naming the financial expert in the public filings would result in the
expert being subject to greater liability under federal securities law and
state corporate law.
51
47. Final Rule, supra note 46.
48. Id. Apart from comments on the proposed rules designed to clarify or modified the
proposed rules, some commenters clearly were unhappy with the entire concept, as opposed
to the SEC's rulemaking effort. For instance, several commenters did not approve of
making any distinctions among the capabilities of one audit committee member and the
other audit committee members. See, e.g., Letter from Ernst & Young LLP to SEC (Nov.
29, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/ernstyoungl.htm. Of
course, the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation itself makes a distinction, so the SEC had no latitude
in that regard. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
49. Final Rule, supra note 46.
50. Final Rule, supra note 46. Another factor limiting the pool of candidates was the
requirement in the Proposed Rule that the financial expert be independent of management,
thus excluding the company's officers. Proposed Rule, supra note 41. Some of the
comments seemed self-serving. For example, a finance professor at Georgetown University
thought the rule unnecessarily excluded eligibility of finance professors, and suggested
broadening the definition to put more emphasis on education, as well as experience as a
consultant, expert witness or financial educator. Letter from James J. Angel to SEC (via e-
mail) (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/jjangel 1.txt.
51. Final Rule, supra note 46. A director's fiduciary duty of care under state law is
normally to discharge his duties with the care a person (or an ordinarily prudent person) in a
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(l)(b) (2004). Delaware
does not have a statutory standard, but seems to apply "gross negligence." See, e.g.,
Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 n. 39 (Del. Ch. 2003). State statutes avoid
requiring any particular skill as a pre-condition to election as a director. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 142(a) (2004); FLA. STAT. § 607.0802 (2004). Nevertheless, a director's
specialized knowledge, qualifications or responsibilities is often relevant in determining his
compliance with the duty of care. MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT, § 8.30 cmt. 2(6) (2000). Even so,
most states have statutory provisions protecting directors from personal liability for
violations of the duty of care. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(c) (West 2004); FLA. STAT.
§ 607.0831(1) (2004).
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In early 2003, the SEC issued its Final Rule implementing section 407
of Sarbanes-Oxley (Final Rule).52 In response to the public comments, the
Final Rule provided a less restrictive set of attributes required to qualify as
a financial expert, as compared to the Proposed Rule.53 For instance, the
Final Rule eliminated the portion of the definition that required the
financial expert to have actual experience applying GAAP to estimates,
accruals and reserves that were generally comparable to those used in the
registrant's financial statements.54 Instead, the Final Rule requires only the
ability to understand GAAP and assess the general application of GAAP in
connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves.55
In addition, instead of requiring experience preparing or auditing
similar financial statements, a financial expert need only have experience
preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements of similar
breadth or complexity or experience actively supervising one or more
persons engaged in such activities.56 There is a much wider range of
people who have analyzed or evaluated financial statements, or supervised
persons who do so, than there are persons who have actually prepared or
audited such financial statements. Nevertheless, the requirements for
active supervision were not specifically delineated by the SEC in the Final
52. Final Rule, supra note 46. The Final Rule has been incorporated into Item 401(h) of
Regulation S-K and Item 401(e) of Regulation S-B, which provide the requirements for
disclosure in annual reports, among other things, and in the forms used to file annual
reports. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2005); Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. §
228.401(e) (2005). For convenience they are collectively referred to in the text as the "Final
Rule." In addition, the Final Rule changed the terminology from "financial expert" to "audit
committee financial expert," with an acknowledgement that no change in meaning was
intended. Final Rule, supra note 46. The two terms are used interchangeably in this article.
53. Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.401(e) (2005).
54. Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.401(e) (2005). A number of the comments
submitted to the SEC complained about the focus on accounting expertise, and various other
organizations noted the inapplicability of GAAP to their financial reporting. See, e.g.,
Letter from Craig L. Evans, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., to SEC (Nov. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed /s74002/clevansl.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2005); Letter from Stan Hung, Director and Chief Financial Officer, United Micro
Electronics Corporation, et al., to SEC (Nov. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/shung.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
55. Final Rule, supra note 46.
56. Id. (emphasis added). Many of the comments on the Proposed Rule objected to the
exclusion of financially sophisticated persons such as investment bankers, finance and
accounting professors and even experienced top-level management like chief executive
officers. See, e.g., Letter from Craig L. Evans to SEC, supra note 54; Letter from Roman L.
Weil, V. Duane Rath Professor of Accounting, Graduate School of Business, University of
Chicago, to SEC (Nov. 29, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
/s74002/rlweill.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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Rule, nor did the Final Rule specify the requisite level of financial expertise
of the supervisor. 57 It is also clear that no experience with internal controls
and procedures are required-just an understanding of such controls and
procedures. 58  Finally, the financial expert must understand the audit
committee functions.59
In addition to providing a less restrictive set of attributes, the SEC
revamped the way a board measures whether the person qualifies as a
financial expert. 60 The list of ten factors which the board was required to
consider in the Proposed Rule was shortened to four standards, any one of
which is a sufficient way for the financial expert to have acquired the
necessary attributes.61 Instead of evaluating ten factors, the board need
only evaluate one or more of the following:
" Education and experience as a principal financial officer, principal
accounting officer, controller, certified public accountant or auditor
(or similar experience in positions that involve similar functions);
* Experience actively supervising one of the foregoing officers or
persons;
* Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies
or public accountants in connection with preparing, auditing or
evaluating financial statements; or
* Other relevant experience. If the company relies on this factor, it
must disclose the relevant experience.62
The following key factors were eliminated from the Proposed Rule:
evaluation of whether the person has ever been certified as a public
accountant or equivalent; any requirement that the relevant expertise be
tied to an SEC reporting company; familiarity and experience with SEC
reporting requirements; and whether the person has served on an audit
committee for a reporting company.63 Those factors were eliminated to
broaden the pool of candidates that would be available to serve as financial
57. Final Rule, supra note 46.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Cf supra note 41.
62. Final Rule, supra note 46. See also Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3)
(2005).
63. Final Rule, supra note 46; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3) (2005).
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experts.64 The NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq retained their requirements that
at least one member of the audit committee have accounting or financial
experience, but stated that satisfying the SEC's definition of financial
expert satisfied the listing standards.65
B. LIABILITY OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS
In the Proposed Rule, the SEC stated that mere designation of a person
as a financial expert should not impose a higher degree of individual
responsibility or obligation on one member of the audit committee.66 Nor
was the Proposed Rule designed to decrease the duties and other
obligations of other board members. 67  The SEC sought comments on
whether it should directly address potential increased liabilities of financial
experts in the final rule.68
It is no surprise that such comments were forthcoming. Based on the
comments, the SEC adopted in the Final Rule a "safe harbor" 69 as follows:
1. The financial expert is not an expert for any purpose under federal
securities laws, in particular section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, by
virtue of such person's designation as a financial expert.70 Section 11
holds certain experts (and officers) responsible for statements in
registration statements and other publicly filed reports.71 For instance,
accountants would be subject to liability under section 11 for signing off
on misleading financial statements included in a registration statement,
64. Final Rule, supra note 46.
65. New York Stock Exchange Section 303A Corporate Governance Rules 11 (Nov. 3,
2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A final rules.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2005); AMEX Company Guide § 121B.(2)(a)(ii) (2005), available at
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanStockExchangeAMEX/AmexCompanyGuide (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005); Nasdaq Corporate Governance Summary of Rule Changes 3 (Nov.
2003), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf (last visited Nov.
7, 2005); See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
66. Proposed Rule, supra note 41.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Final Rule, supra note 46; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(4) (2005). The
"safe harbor" characterization is a bit of a misnomer. The so-called safe harbors in the Final
Rule are simply pronouncements by the SEC that the financial expert is protected from any
special liabilities and responsibilities by virtue of the designation. In other words, the
financial expert need not take any particular action to find his or her way to the safe harbor.
The financial expert is essentially born in the safe harbor.
70. Final Rule, supra note 46.
71. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2004).
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and there is no scienter requirement as there is with the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws.
7 2
2. Designation as a financial expert does not impose on such person any
duties, obligations or liabilities greater than those imposed on the
members of an audit committee or board in the absence of such
designation or identification.73
3. Designation of a financial expert does not alter the duties, obligations
or liability of any other member of the audit committee.74
It remained to be seen whether in practice the Final Rule permitted a
sufficiently large pool of qualified persons to serve as financial experts,
taking into account the definition of financial expert and the liability safe
harbors. The evidence indicates the Final Rule has been successful in that
regard, but it cost investors much of the protection originally intended by
section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley.75
IV. FINANCIAL EXPERT RULES IN PRACTICE
An examination of reports filed with the SEC provides insight into the
way companies have reacted to the SEC's Final Rules on audit committee
financial experts.76 The author reviewed SEC filings for the thirty
companies comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Dow),77 the 100
companies comprising the Nasdaq 100 Composite Index (Nasdaq 100), 7 8
fifty selected companies included in the Russell 2000 Index (Russell
72. Id. This portion of the safe harbor makes sense, because no member of the audit
committee is charged with actual preparation of the financial statements. Audit committee
members serve merely in an oversight role. AM. LAW INST, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 (1994).
73. Final Rule, supra note 46; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.40 1(h)(4) (2005).
74. Final Rule, supra note 46; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (h)(4) (2005).
75. See infra Parts III and IV.
76. The study described in this Part is based on company SEC filings found on the SEC's
web site (www.sec.gov) between June 21, 2005, and July 6, 2005. In most cases, those
filings represented data for the calendar year 2004, but many companies with non-standard
fiscal years have not yet filed proxy statements and annual reports in 2005. For those
companies, the data represents only a portion of calendar year 2004, depending on the
company's fiscal year end. The companies used in the study were members of the
respective indices as of the dates set forth in notes 7 through 10, supra.
77. See supra note 7.
78. See supra note 8.
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2000) 79 and fifty selected companies included in the Russell Microcap
Index (Russell Microcap).8 °
The Dow was selected for the study to represent companies with large
market capitalizations. The Nasdaq 100 and Russell 2000 indices were
selected to represent companies with mid-sized and small market
capitalizations, respectively. The Russell Microcap Index was selected to
reflect some of the smallest public companies. Because of certain overlaps,
there were ultimately 228 companies in the survey.81
79. See supra note 9. An effort was made to include companies in the Russell 2000 Index
with a variety of market capitalizations and from a variety of industries. The 50 companies
selected from the Russell 2000 Index are: 1-800 Flowers.com; Alaska Air Group; Aquila;
Bluegreen; Boston Beer Company; Carmike Cinemas; Chiquita Brands International;
Cooper Tire & Rubber; Ditech Communications; Discovery Laboratories; East West
Bancorp; Elizabeth Arden; Federal Signal; Frontier Oil; Getty Realty; Guess; Haverty
Furniture; Imation; Ivillage; Joy Global; Kirby; Lexar Media; Mapics; Medcath; Mesa Air
Group; Movado Group; Netratings; OpLink Communications; Panera Bread; Playboy
Enterprises; Reader's Digest Association; Ryan's Restaurant Group; Scholastic; Sharper
Image; South Jersey Industries; Sunoco; Teledyne Technologies; Titan Corporation;
Trustmark Corporation; Tupperware; United Rentals; Unova; ValueClick; Vital Signs;
Vitesse Semiconductor; Werner Enterprises; Winnebago Industries; Yankee Candle
Company; and Zale.
80. See supra note 10. An effort was made to include companies in the Russell Microcap
Index with a variety of market capitalizations and from a variety of industries. The 50
companies selected from the Russell Microcap Index are: Aceto; Agilisys; Anworth
Mortgage Asset; Beasley Broadcast Group; Blair; Blue Nile; Buffalo Wild Wings; Candies;
Carrier Access; Ciber; Craftmade International; Cyberguard; Dusa Pharmaceuticals; EFC
Bancorp; Evergreen Solar; EZCorp; Farmer Bros.; Five Star Quality Care; Gehl; Goodrich
Petroleum; Harris & Harris Group; Huron Consulting Group; Illumina; International
Aluminum; Kentucky First Federal; Krispy Kreme Doughnut; Ladish; Lasercard; Magma
Design Automation; MarineMax; Micromuse; National Beverage; Netbank; Nexstar
Broadcasting; Omega Protein; Packeteer; PC Mall; Peregrine Pharmaceuticals; Radiation
Therapy Services; Retail Ventures; SEMCO Energy; Smith & Wesson Holdings; Sport
Chalet; Steinway Musical Instruments; Sykes Enterprises; Tipperary; Topps; Utah Medical
Products; Vitria Technology; and Yak Communications.
81. Two companies are in both the Dow and the Nasdaq 100: Home Depot and United
Technologies.
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The following table shows the median market capitalizations of the
four groups as of June 21, 2005:82
Market Cap
Index (in billions)
Dow 83  $91.05
Nasdaq 10084 8.00
Russell 200085 0.77
Russell Microcap 86  0.24
An examination of the annual reports and proxy statements for these
companies indicates at least four things regarding audit committee financial
experts:
1. Companies are not struggling to find audit committee financial
experts, although larger companies appear to have a larger pool of
candidates.
87
2. Most of the designated financial experts have experience as chief
financial officers (CFO) and/or chief executive officers (CEO) at
public companies, or as certified public accountants (CPA) at large
accounting firms.88
82. Market capitalization data is from http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited June 21,
2005).
83. The largest company in the Dow is General Electric, at $384.3 billion, while the
smallest is General Motors, at $20.3 billion.
84. The largest company in the Nasdaq 100 is Cisco Systems, at $126.7 billion, and the
smallest is Level 3 Communications, at $1.5 billion.
85. The largest of the fifty companies selected from the Russell 2000 is Sunoco, at $7.9
billion, and the smallest is Sharper Image, at $200 million. The market capitalization of
Mapics is not included in the Russell 2000 market capitalization figure because Mapics was
acquired and taken private during the study, and thus had no public market capitalization as
of June 21, 2005.
86. Market capitalization data is from http://finance.yahoo.com (visited on June 21,
2005). The largest of the fifty companies selected from the Russell Microcap is Radiation
Therapy Services, at $620 million, and the smallest is PC Mall, at $50 million.
87. See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
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3. Very few companies are concerned enough about increased
liability for audit committee financial experts to include a
disclaimer of liability or a reference to the SEC safe harbor.89
4. Possibly as a result of the third conclusion, it is extremely rare for a
company to pay additional compensation to its audit committee
financial expert to compensate for additional risk (or duties)
beyond those of other audit committee members or chairpersons. 90
A. AVAILABLE POOL OF AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERTS
The SEC broadened its criteria for qualifying as an audit committee
financial expert between the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule, primarily to
ensure that a sufficient number of people would be available to fill that
role, particularly in small companies. 9' Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Final Rule do not require a company to designate a financial expert, but
require companies without a financial expert to disclose in their annual
report (or as part of the annual proxy statement) the reason for not
designating a financial expert.92 Of the 228 companies surveyed, only four
failed to identify an audit committee financial expert in their SEC filings.93
The 224 other companies in the survey have at least one financial expert.
Of the four companies that failed to designate an audit committee
financial expert, two complied with the disclosure requirement and
provided a reason.94 Molex Corporation, part of the Nasdaq 100, said,
"[g]iven the level of financial sophistication and business experience of the
Audit Committee members, the board of directors believes that the Audit
Committee members can perform the audit committee functions as
89. See infra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 49, 51-65 and accompanying text.
92. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 790 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).; Final Rule, supra note 46; Regulation S-
K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1) (2005).
93. This finding is consistent with a survey conducted by Governance Metrics
International, a corporate governance research firm, which found 95% of 1,157 U.S.
companies surveyed had a financial expert on the audit committee. New York Stock
Exchange, Good Governance Tied to Performance, THE EXCHANGE 5 (Vol. 11, No. 11)
(Nov. 2004), at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/xnlvl lnll .pdf.
94. Network Appliance and Yak Communications provided no reason for failing to
designate a financial expert. In fact, they do not mention financial experts at all. See infra
notes 98-99. Molex and Topps clearly made the decision that investors would not shy away
from those companies for failing to designate a financial expert.
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required. 95 Topps, part of the Russell Microcap, said something similar.
Its filing says, "[t]he board believes that each of the current members of the
Audit Committee is able to read and understand fundamental financial
statements and is 'financially sophisticated' ... [t]herefore, our Board of
Directors has concluded that the appointment of an additional director to
the Audit Committee is not necessary at this time.
96
Two companies not only failed to designate an audit committee
financial expert, but also failed to provide a reason as required by SEC
rules. 97 There is some evidence that this was merely an oversight because
both companies-Network Appliance and Yak Communications-failed to
mention the financial expert concept or the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement
altogether.98 In addition, their annual reports and proxy statements are not
yet due in 2005. Thus, the only available filings are from 2004, the first
year in which the financial expert disclosures were required by law. Yak
Communications has two audit committee members who would easily
qualify as audit committee financial experts under the Final Rule, and
Network Appliance has one. 99
As noted, the SEC expressed concern that its definition in the Proposed
Rule would make it difficult for companies to find qualified people to serve
as financial experts.100 The study shows that larger companies have had an
easier time finding financial experts, but that ninety-nine percent of the
companies were able to find at least one.101 Of the 224 companies with a
financial expert, approximately thirty-five percent (seventy-eight
95. Molex Corporation, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Sep. 15, 2004)
(data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/
searchedgar/companysearch.html).
96. Topps Inc., Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Jun. 13, 2005) (data
obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html).
97. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1)(iii) (2005).
98. Network Appliance, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Jul. 15, 2004);
Yak Communications, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Nov. 15, 2004) (data
obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar
/companysearch.html).
99. Id. Yak has two former public company chief financial officers. Network Appliance
has only one returning audit committee member, but he is a certified public accountant.
100. See supra notes 49, 51-65 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. This calculation assumes that Network
Appliance and Yak Communications will designate a financial expert in their 2005 proxy
statements since they each have audit committee members who clearly qualify under the
Final Rule's definition.
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companies) designated more than one financial expert. The companies in
the Russell Microcap were less likely to designate more than one financial
expert. 10 2  That does not mean the companies designating only one
financial expert had only one financial expert. It simply means they only
designated one. 
103
The following table shows by index group the number of companies
designating a financial expert, the number of financial experts designated,
the average number of financial experts designated and the percentage of
companies who designated all members of their audit committee as
financial experts.
Companies
Where All
Avg. Fin. Members
Number Experts are
Number of of Fin. per Financial
Index Companies Experts Company Experts
Dow 30 65 2.2 20%
Nasdaq 96 155 1.6 13%
100104
Russell 50 77 1.5 12%
2000
Russell 48 56 1.2 2%
Microcap
Totals 224 350 1.6
The table shows that the number of designated financial experts bears a
direct relationship to the size of the company, at least when measured in
102. Only seven of the forty-eight Russell Microcap companies with a financial expert
designated more than one.
103. It is not uncommon for a company to state in its filings that it has "at least one audit
committee financial expert" but then designate only one. See, e.g., Xilinx, Schedule 14A
Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Jun. 1, 2005) (data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar
Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html). In some
cases, use of such language is simply mimicking the SEC rule and the company does not
appear to have more than one audit committee member who qualifies. In other cases, the
use of such language may indicate a reluctance to name more than one, since only one is
required to be disclosed.
104. Data excludes Home Depot and United Technologies, which are also members of the
Dow.
[Vol. 2:1
FINANCIAL EXPERT ON THE BOARD
these groupings by index. The largest companies in the study on average-
members of the Dow-designated more financial experts on average and
were more likely to designate all members of their audit committee as
financial experts. By contrast, the smallest companies in the study on
average-members of the Russell Microcap Index-designated fewer
financial experts on average, and were unlikely to designate all members of
their audit committee as financial experts.
B. EXPERTISE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERTS
The vast majority of companies with a financial expert did not list the
criteria by which they made the determination that the person qualified as a
financial expert. The Final Rule does not require such disclosure, except in
limited circumstances, and the filings indicate that most companies chose
to disclose the bare minimum. 0 5 A few companies-mostly in the Russell
2000 and Russell Microcap indices-included specific statements about
why their designated financial experts qualified under the Final Rule.,
0 6
Nevertheless, the SEC's proxy statement rules require proxy statements to
describe the relevant business background of the company's directors.
0 7
Because all of the audit committee financial experts are by definition
directors, a sophisticated and diligent investor can look to the director
"bios" to see the director's qualifications, though the information may not
reveal his or her financial qualifications.'0 8
The following table shows the ten most common experiential or
educational attributes listed in the director biographies for those designated
as financial experts, with a breakdown of the frequency by index group
studied:' 09
105. Final Rule, supra note 46.
106. See, e.g., Steinway Musical Instruments, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement
(filed Apr. 25, 2005) (data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html).
107. Schedule 14A, Item 7(b) says the annual proxy statement must include the disclosure
required by Item 401 of Regulation S-K, which includes the director's business experience
during the last five years. Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(b) (2005);
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e). "What is required is information relating to the
level of his professional competence...." Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (2005).
108. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (2005).
109. Some of the financial experts qualify under more than one category of experiences
or education. A frequent combination is the CFO/CPA qualification. The table lists the ten
most common qualifications from the company filings, but more than thirty different
categories were compiled in the study for financial experts at the subject companies.
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Nasdaq Russell Russell
Position Dow 100 2000 Microcap
CFO of Public 3 50 23 16
Company
1lo
CEO of Public 37 27 18 4
Company' 11
CPA (large acctg 3 26 8 23
firm)
CEO of Private 3 12 7 6
Company'
12
Investor/Venture 2 8 6 1
Capitalist
MBA Degree 1 3  1 9 1 5
Lawyer 14  0 3 4 3
Investment 1 8 5 2
Banker" 5
Chair of Public 1 5 3 0
Company1
6
Director of 2 3 1 2
Public
Company' '7
Everything from consultants and general business experience, to professors of chemistry and
engineering, to former SEC commissioners and a former Deputy Secretary of Agriculture
are included.
110. The determination of whether a company is a public company or private company
was made using Internet research using http://www.google.com (searches conducted from
June 21, 2005 through July 12, 2005). It is possible that a company was public at the time
of a director's relevant experience, but not a public company at the time of the search; and
vice versa.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. As a rule, the MBAs on this list are from well-recognized institutions of higher
education. In addition, nearly all of the financial experts with an MBA had other relevant
experience that qualified them as a financial expert. It is questionable whether a bare MBA
alone could satisfy the Final Rule's requirements.
114. As a rule, the lawyers are from large well-recognized law firms in major
metropolitan areas.
115. The majority of directors in the investment banker category were investment
bankers, but seven were executive directors or managing directors of investment banks. In
this category, there is some variation in the size of the investment banking firms.
116. See supra note 110.
117. See supra note 110.
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Under the more restrictive definition of the Proposed Rule, it is clear
that a CEO of a private company would not qualify as a financial expert
because the Proposed Rule would have required the person's financial
expertise to be obtained in connection with an Exchange Act reporting
company.' 18 In addition, most public company CEOs, investor/venture
capitalists, MBAs, lawyers, investment bankers, chairs of public companies
and public company directors would not have qualified under the Proposed
Rule if those were their highest and best qualifications for the position. In
most cases, they would fail to meet the definition by not having actual
experience preparing or auditing financial statements, which would have
been required by the Proposed Rule. 119 All were determined by their
respective boards to qualify as financial experts under the Final Rule.
C. DISCLAIMERS REGARDING FINANCIAL EXPERT LIABILITY
In the Final Rule, the SEC created safe harbors to protect audit
committee financial experts from potential increased liability as a result of
being designated as a financial expert. 20  Company counsel advising
reporting companies about disclosure might be inclined to include
disclaimers about the audit committee financial experts' potential liability
if they felt the safe harbor was insufficient protection. Alternatively,
company counsel might advise disclosure that reiterated the SEC's safe
harbor. Yet, of the 224 companies in the study that designated at least one
financial expert, only twelve included such a disclaimer, and in each case
the disclaimer essentially reiterated the SEC's safe harbor.12'
The companies in the Dow and the Nasdaq 100 were more likely to
have disclaimers. Ten percent of the Dow companies and six percent of the
Nasdaq 100 companies included disclaimers, as compared to two percent
and four percent for the Russell 2000 and Russell Microcap samples,
respectively. Those results may be related to the sophistication of company
counsel, which often is a function of company size, but most public
companies have sophisticated securities counsel. 2
2
118. Proposed Rule, supra note 41.
119. Id.
120. Disclosure Required By Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Securities Act Release No. 8177, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235, 79 SEC Docket 1077
(January 23, 2003).
121. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 401(h)(4) (2005).
122. Based upon the author's experience as a corporate lawyer for eight years at a
national law firm.
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The disclaimers emphasize part two of the safe harbor, explaining that
the financial expert has no duties, obligations or liabilities greater than the
other audit committee members or the board. 123 Below is representative
language from a Nasdaq 100 company filing:
Shareholders should understand that this designation is an SEC disclosure
requirement relating to Mr. Friedman's and Mr. Hiram's experience and
understanding of certain accounting and auditing matters, which the SEC
has stated does not impose on the directors so designated any additional
duty, obligation or liability than otherwise is imposed generally by virtue
of serving on the Audit Committee and/or the Board of Directors.1
24
Most of the disclaimers are equally brief, but SBC Communications,
one of the Dow companies, includes a much longer disclaimer that
incorporates some of the SEC's background comments from the Final Rule
release. 25 For instance, the SBC disclosure adds, "[t]hey are not auditors
or accountants, do not perform 'field work' and are not full-time
employees.' 26
Those, however, are the exceptions. Nearly 95% of the companies in
the study appear comfortable the safe harbor adequately protects their audit
committee financial expert or experts.
D. COMPENSATION OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS
One might expect the specter of potential increased liability and duties
of the financial experts, as well as the limited pool of qualified
candidates-which were the principle objections expressed to the SEC in
reaction to its Proposed Rule-would cause companies to pay additional
compensation to persons serving as financial experts. Yet, of the 224
companies surveyed that designated at least one financial expert, only one
company provided a special fee to its financial expert because of his status
123. See supra text accompanying note 73.
124. Comverse Technology, Inc., Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed May 9,
2005) (data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html). Interestingly, Comverse did
not include a disclaimer in its proxy statement for the prior year, although it did designate an
audit committee financial expert. Comverse Technology, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy
Statement (filed May 3, 2004).
125. SBC Communications, Inc., Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Mar.
11, 2005) (data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html).
126. Id.
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as a financial expert.127 One other company specifically mentions that the
audit committee chair's designation as a financial expert was a factor in
determining his compensation. 
128
That being said, audit committee chairs are frequently paid more than
other directors and more than regular audit committee members.129 This is
significant because more than four-fifths of the board members designated
as financial experts in the subject companies are chairing the audit
committee. 
30
Based on the study, the chart below shows how the companies in the
Dow, the Nasdaq 100, the Russell 2000 and the Russell Microcap
compensated, on average, their audit committee chairs in relation to
ordinary board members, ordinary committee members, regular audit
127. Linear Technology, Inc., a Nasdaq 100 company, pays its financial expert an
$115,000 annual fee. Linear Technology, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed
Sep. 24, 2004) (data obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html).
128. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., a Russell Microcap company, discloses that its audit
committee chairperson is paid more because he is also a financial expert. Krispy Kreme
Doughnuts, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Apr. 26, 2004) (data obtained
using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/company
search.html).
129. For purposes of the study, compensation ignores the value of options granted to
directors but includes annual stock-based compensation when the stock award is based on a
specified dollar amount. Nearly every company grants options to directors, but the value of
such awards varies with the company and the timing of the grant. Also, the study focused
on directors who were not serving as chair of the board, because the chair of the board
sometimes receives additional compensation for chairing the board. In addition, companies
often pay a fee for attending board meetings and committee meetings. For simplicity of
calculation, the figures in this article assume the board committees, other than the audit
committee, meet four times a year, which is the most common frequency. The figures in
this article assume the audit committee meets eight times a year, which seems to be the most
common frequency among the companies studied, although there is significant variation.
For instance, the audit committee of Adobe Systems met twenty times in 2004. Adobe
Systems Inc., Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement) (filed Mar. 14, 2005) (information
obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at http://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html). The figures further assume that all committee
meetings are on the same day as regular board meetings and that all meetings are attended in
person.
130. In the study, 171 of the companies had their financial expert serving as chair. Forty-
one companies had a chair who was not designated the financial expert. Twelve companies
did not report sufficient information about the audit committee to make a determination
about who was chairing the committee. The remaining four did not designate a financial
expert.
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committee members and the chair of the compensation committee (dollar
figures rounded to nearest hundred):
Board
Member
$112,500
45,100
Comm
Member
$116,300
48,800
Audit
Comm
Member
$122,000
55,400
33,800 37,300 42,800
22,400 23,500 26,300
$ 46,800 $ 49,900 $ 55,200
Compensa
tion Chair
$126,40C
55,10C
42,20C
26.60C
$ 55,70C $ 65,10'
Among companies in the study, the audit committee chair received an
average of approximately 39% more in fees than an ordinary board
member, 30% more than an ordinary committee member and 18% more
than a regular audit committee member. On average, they also receive
approximately 17% more than the chair of the compensation committee,
which tends to be the second ranking committee in the board committee
hierarchy. 131
Based on the study, the following table shows on a percentage basis
how much more compensation the audit committee chairs receive, on
average, than ordinary board members, ordinary committee members,
regular audit committee members and the chair of the compensation
committee:
131. It is interesting to note that ordinary audit committee members receive
approximately the same fees as the compensation committee chair. In large measure this is
due to per-meeting fees and the fact that the audit committee typically meets at least twice
as often as other committees, which allows the audit committee members to "catch up" their
compensation to that of the compensation committee chair.
Index
Dow
Nasdaq
100
Russell
2000
Russell
Micro-
cap
Average
Audit
Chair
$136,20,
66,90,
51,80,
31.00,
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Audit
Board Committee Comm Compensation
Index Member Member Member Chair
Dow 21% 17% 12% 8%
Nasdaq 100 48% 37% 21% 21%
Russell 2000 54% 39% 21% 23%
Russell 38% 32% 18% 17%
Microcap
Overall 39% 31% 18% 17%
In the study, the Nasdaq 100 and Russell 2000 companies paid the
audit committee chair more fees in relation to the ordinary board member,
ordinary committee member, regular audit committee member and chair of
the compensation committee than companies in the Dow or Russell
Microcap. The lowest compensation disparities among the audit committee
chairs and the other groups were found in the Dow companies. Since the
biggest disparities were for the selected Russell 2000 companies, followed
by the Nasdaq 100, the selected Russell Microcap companies and then the
Dow, there appears to be very little direct correlation with company size-
at least when measured by these clusters of companies in the respective
indices.
Based on the study, there is no significant evidence that companies are
paying financial experts solely for being designated as such, particularly
since only two companies do so. And while the audit committee chairs,
most of whom are financial experts, receive significant additional
compensation, the additional fees appear to be tied to the additional work
involved with chairing the most high profile committee in the current
corporate environment. Many of the filings specifically say that the audit
committee members, and the chair, receive significant additional
compensation because of the additional work and meetings involved. In
fact, audit committees appear to meet at least twice as often (and
sometimes much more frequently) than a typical board committee. 1
32
It is possible that fees for being a financial expert are hidden in the
audit committee chair fees. In the study, twenty-five companies designated
every member of their audit committee as a financial expert. If companies
were factoring in increased duties or liabilities of the financial expert into
132. See Adobe Systems, Inc., supra note 129.
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the audit committee chair's compensation, we would expect to see
significantly smaller differences between the fees of the audit committee
chairs and regular audit committee members in those twenty-five
companies, since all of the audit committee members are designated
financial experts and ought to be paid about the same.
For those twenty-five companies, the audit committee chair
compensation exceeds the compensation of regular audit committee
members by approximately 13%, compared to the other companies in the
study (18%). So while there is some difference, the difference is not
significantly smaller, particularly when taking into account that those
twenty-five have significantly larger market capitalizations and pay their
audit committee members and audit committee chairs approximately
$18,000 more per year, on average, than the other 199 companies in the
study. 1
33
V. A BETTER FINANCIAL EXPERT RULE FOR INVESTORS
The intent of section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the financial expert
rules is to provide an additional layer of oversight of financial reporting
and therefore more protection for investors.1 34 When the SEC issued its
Proposed Rule regarding audit committee financial experts, it received
comments from practitioners, scholars and the business community
indicating two primary concerns. First, there was concern that the
restrictive definition of audit committee financial experts would create a
pool of candidates that was too narrow. 135 There was particular concern
that small companies would face an uphill battle in finding people to serve
as audit committee financial experts. 136 Second, there was concern that
labeling a board member a "financial expert" would put a target on the
person's back and subject the financial expert to increased risk under
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and state law fiduciary duty
principles.'
37
133. The median market capitalization of the 25 companies that designated all of their
audit committee members as financial experts was $6.2 billion. The median market
capitalization of the 199 other companies with a financial expert, other than Mapics (for
which a market capitalization could not be computed as of June 21, 2005) was $3.5 billion.
Market capitalization data is as of June 21, 2005 from http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited
June 21, 2005).
134. Proposed Rule, supra note 41.
135. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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In reaction to the comments, the SEC issued its Final Rule, broadening
the definition of audit committee "financial expert" and adding the safe
harbors from liability.1 38 By doing so, the SEC diminished the significance
of having a financial expert on the audit committee, and deprived investors
of the additional layer of oversight of financial reporting that Congress
originally intended when enacting section 407.
A. A BETTER DEFINITION OF AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERT
The study indicates that most of the subject companies found little
difficulty in finding someone to serve as the audit committee financial
expert, although companies in the Russell Microcap had fewer financial
experts overall. 139 In fact, more than one-third of the companies were able
to designate more than one financial expert, and more than 10% were able
to designate every member of the audit committee as a financial expert. 4 °
Most of the designated financial experts had experience as the CFO or
CEO of a public company, or as a CPA at a large accounting firm.'4 '
It appears that the Final Rule regarding audit committee financial
experts was a significant improvement on the Proposed Rule, and perhaps
has successfully addressed concerns about a limited pool of candidates.
However, there was a significant trade-off in the SEC's decision to broaden
its definition of audit committee financial expert. The end result is a
definition that allows directors to be designated financial experts without
having the sort of financial expertise investors would want or expect on the
audit committee. Accordingly, the Final Rule gives investors the illusion
that they have additional safeguards through the financial expert, when in
fact virtually nothing changed. 142
Ensuring a sufficient pool of available candidates is clearly an
important part of the SEC's rulemaking. However, expanding the
definition too much, as the SEC has done in the Final Rule, allows directors
to be designated financial experts without inspiring investor confidence in
the selection. For example, what comfort can an investor take in knowing
that the financial expert on a company's audit committee is a former
138. Final Rule, supra note 46. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 103 and accompanying table.
140. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
142. One might argue that the real purpose of section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley was to
restore investor confidence and that illusory measures accomplish that goal just as well as
real ones. False confidence tends to be short-lived, however.
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consultant, or a lawyer, or a professor of chemistry, or a director of a public
company? If those are the financial expert's best qualifications for the
position, the investor has no reason to feel any more confidence in the
oversight of the financial reporting process than before the enactment of
section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley.1
43
The definition in the Proposed Rule was undoubtedly too restrictive, as
it tended to eliminate anyone who was not a former public company CFO
or certified public accountant. However, it would not have been difficult
for the SEC to examine a representative set of public company filings to
determine if companies had board members who would qualify as financial
experts and tailor a rule that created a sufficiently broad pool of candidates
while permitting only truly qualified board members to be designated as the
financial expert.
The source of the flaw in the final definition is partially found in the
"other relevant experience" factor, which is a back door for marginally
qualified candidates. 44 The Proposed Rule had a very restrictive set of
required attributes, which focused on actual experience applying GAAP
and preparing or auditing financial statements, all in connection with an
Exchange Act reporting company.1 45 It then contained ten factors for the
board to consider in evaluating whether the person had those attributes. 146
The tenth factor was a catchall provision designed to take into account
other qualifications and experience. 47 But the Proposed Rule's catchall
provision included detailed language regarding the person's ability to
understand and evaluate financial information. 148 In addition, it was only
one of ten factors and the board was required to consider all ten.
149
The Final Rule eliminated some of the required attributes, permitting
experience assessing, analyzing and evaluating GAAP financial statements
as opposed to experience actually preparing and auditing, as was the case
143. In effect, the investor still has to simply trust the board's judgment. That is, of
course, a long-standing principle of corporate governance. Investors who do not like a
board's decisions, and who do not have sufficient voting power to control the board
composition, may "vote with their feet" - that is, sell their shares. However, with section
407, Congress intended to give investors additional protection.
144. See supra text accompanying note 62.
145. Proposed Rule, supra note 41 and text accompanying note 43.
146. Proposed Rule, supra note 41 and text accompanying note 45.
147. Proposed Rule, supra note 41.
148. Id.
149. Proposed Rule, supra note 41 and text accompanying note 45.
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with the Proposed Rule. 150  It also allowed supervision of financial
personnel to substitute for that experience. 15' Those changes created a
potentially broader pool of candidates because people with experience as a
CEO or securities analyst, for example, could potentially qualify as
financial experts with the required attributes.
The Final Rule also reduced the number of factors to be considered by
the board to one of four, and replaced the more detailed catchall provision
in the Proposed Rule with the simple phrase "other relevant experience."'
152
Such a broad catchall, on the heels of more permissive attributes, opened
the door too widely. It also permitted the board to hide the ball from
investors. Although the Final Rule requires the board to disclose the
person's relevant experience if the catchall category is used, it can satisfy
this requirement simply by including the director bios that the company is
already required to provide under the proxy statement rules.' 53 Thus,
investors get no new disclosure about the person's qualifications as a
financial expert based on "other relevant experience."
The SEC should make three significant changes to the Final Rule
definition of audit committee financial expert:
(1) eliminate the "other relevant experience" item as way to acquire
the required attributes;
(2) require the education and experience of the financial expert to be
with issuers required to file reports pursuant to Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act or registered investment companies; and
(3) require the company to disclose the attributes and qualifications of
the designated financial expert proximately to the designation in
the proxy statement or annual report.
154
150. Final Rule, supra note 46. It goes without saying that more people have analyzed
and evaluated financial statements than have audited and prepared them, which is a more
specialized skill.
151. Id.
152. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3)(iv) (2005).
153. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h), Instruction 2 (2005).
154. Companies may fear disclosing the basis for the board's decision that a financial
expert qualifies as such because doing so might open the board's actions to additional
scrutiny by investors. That, however, is the whole concept of transparency. Besides, the
board's decisions in that regard would be protected by the business judgment rule, so if
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What the proposed amendments seek to accomplish is designation of a
financial expert with sophisticated knowledge of financial reporting and
experience, actually applying that knowledge or actively supervising
people with that experience,' 55 all in the same context in which the person
will be fulfilling the role of financial expert: that of an Exchange Act
reporting company. The amendments also would give an investor the
ability to assess the value of a particular financial expert by requiring the
company to include a sentence or two, proximate to the disclosure of the
financial expert, explaining why the financial expert qualifies as such.
Below are some of the common experience and educational
backgrounds held by designated financial experts at companies in the
study, and how they would fare under the amendments proposed in this
article, if the positions below were the person's best financial
qualifications: 1
56
1. Public Company CEO
A public company CEO often will qualify under the Final Rule because
many CEOs have the "ability to assess" application of GAAP and have
either analyzed or evaluated financial statements or actively supervised
personnel who have done so. Likewise, the public company CEO would
often qualify under the amendments proposed in this article because the
CEO's experience supervising financial personnel and involvement in
assessing the company's financial statements would qualify even in the
absence of "other relevant experience," and the experience would be in a
there was any rational basis for determining a financial expert is qualified, there would be
no breach of fiduciary duty. Books and articles too numerous to catalog here detail the
operation of the business judgment rule and the policy reasons to support it. See, e.g.,
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998).
155. Some would argue the board already is motivated to get the best qualified person as
a financial expert. However, companies often prefer to do the bare minimum to meet
disclosure requirements. This is particularly true if the disclosure is a single sentence
swallowed by a sea of paragraphs in a fifty-page disclosure document. In addition, once the
SEC took away any significant responsibility of the financial expert, beyond the
responsibilities as a director and audit committee member, some of the company's incentive
was taken away too.
156. None of these positions would have qualified under the Proposed Rule because they
do not involve the preparation and auditing of financial statements for a reporting company.
CFOs of public companies and CPAs would have qualified under the Proposed Rule, under
the Final Rule, and under this article's proposed amendments. Indeed, they can be
considered the most qualified in terms of experience and education.
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public company context.157 Thus, the amendments proposed in this article
would not adversely affect the ability of a public company CEO to qualify
as a financial expert.
2. Private Company CEO
A private company CEO may qualify under the Final Rule for the same
reason as a public company CEO. In fact, directors whose best financial
experience was as a private company CEO have been frequently designated
financial experts by the companies in the study.1 58 However, the private
company CEO would not qualify under the amendments proposed in this
article because the CEO's experience would not have been with an
Exchange Act reporting company.
As anyone who has worked with public companies would attest, there
is a world of difference between financial statements for a reporting
company, with its complex layer of SEC regulation, and financial reporting
for a private company. At a private company, there are few rules: audits
are not required, and they are not subject to scrutiny by the public at large.
Since the financial expert on an audit committee is the principal liaison and
overseer of the work done by the financial managers and the public
accountants, experience with audits and public reporting is a key
component. Former CEOs of private companies, without more, should not
qualify as financial experts.
3. Investment Bankers
Many investment bankers assess and evaluate financial statements.
Accordingly, they likely qualify under the Final Rule. They also likely
qualify under the amendments proposed in this article, so long as their
investment banking experience related to Exchange Act reporting
companies. Because they often have experience assessing the performance
of companies with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of
financial statements, they do not need to rely on the "other relevant
experience" provision.
157. This does not imply that all public company CEOs qualify under either the Final
Rule definition or the amendments proposed in this article. They must meet the required
attributes.
158. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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One might argue that investment bankers do not have the correct
perspective for an audit committee financial expert, since "spin" is a large
component of what many investment bankers do. Investors do not want
spin when it comes to financial reporting. However, investment bankers
are extremely sophisticated financial analysts and highly attuned to the
market and needs of investors. The financial expert will not have a direct
hand in the preparation of the financial statements, so the opportunity for
financial manipulation is not as significant. In fact, having a financial
expert well-versed in financial statement spin is probably good for
investors, because in the oversight role, the financial expert will be in a
unique position to recognize financial manipulation and stamp it out.
4. Investors, Venture Capitalists and Lawyers
Investors, venture capitalists, and lawyers would apparently qualify
under the Final Rule, especially considering that many of the companies in
the study designated them as financial experts. 159  Investors, venture
capitalists and lawyers usually would not qualify under the amendments
proposed in this article, if those were their best qualifications. Most
investors, venture capitalists and lawyers have no direct experience with a
company's preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial statements in a
public company context.
Investors may evaluate for their own purposes, but not in connection
with the company's responsibilities. Thus, investors qualify in the Final
Rule under the "other relevant experience" category. Venture capitalists
are typically more directly involved with a company's financial reporting,
but generally only when the company is still at the private company stage.
And while securities lawyers frequently brush against issues associated
with financial reporting, they are primarily concerned with including
accurate information in the disclosure document, as opposed to evaluating
the accuracy of the financial statements themselves and the internal
controls associated with financial reporting. Those matters are left to
financial managers, accountants and investment bankers.
The amendments proposed in this article would not categorically
exclude investors, venture capitalists and lawyers, but would certainly
narrow the number of them who would qualify.
159. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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5. Chairs of Public Companies/Directors of Public Companies
These positions appear to qualify under the Final Rule, considering that
many of the companies in the study designated them as financial experts.'
60
Chairs and directors of public companies usually would not qualify under
the amendments proposed in this article if they did not play a significant
role on the audit committee. A chairperson or ordinary board member has
no role in actual preparation of financial statements, and very little, if any,
role in oversight of the preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial
statements, apart from receiving reports from financial managers and the
audit committee.
6. Other Experience
It is impossible to exhaust the range of experiences of potential
financial experts. However, some other experience that boards have
determined qualify under the Final Rule would not qualify under the
amendments proposed in this article. Examples include most consultants,
officers of non-profit corporations, professors of science and even
professors of finance, assuming those were their best financial
qualifications. None of that experience, without more, qualifies a board
member to oversee the company's management and auditors in the
financial reporting process, at the level of sophistication of an Exchange
Act reporting company, except in special circumstances.
The proposed amendments to the definition of "audit committee
financial expert" would narrow the pool of available candidates, but would
strike a useful balance between the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule. Of
the 224 companies in the study who designated a financial expert, an
estimated thirty-eight would not have a financial expert who would qualify
under the amendments proposed by this article. The estimate is based
solely on positions held by the financial experts as disclosed in their
director bios. They may have experience that would qualify them under the
amendments proposed in this article, but since their specific qualifications
as financial experts are not required to be disclosed, this is unclear.
It does not necessarily follow that financial experts would be
unavailable to those thirty-eight companies. It simply means the
companies might have to do a little more work to find them. That seems a
160. Id.
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small price to pay, since the goal of section 407 is to provide investors with
additional protection in the oversight of financial reporting.1 6' Smaller
companies, like those in the Russell Microcap, may have more difficulty
finding directors who qualify as financial experts under the amendments
proposed by this article. Or, they may not. It is an insufficient argument to
speculate that complying with the intent of Congress and the needs of
investors is going to be too burdensome, at least until the waters have been
tested.
B. A BETTER SAFE HARBOR
The SEC filings in the study indicate companies and their legal counsel
are not particularly concerned about increased liability for financial
experts, as only approximately 5% of the companies with a financial expert
included any disclaimers about financial expert liability. 62 As of July 12,
2005, a Westlaw search revealed no reported decisions claiming breach of
fiduciary duty by a financial expert. Perhaps for this reason only two
companies out of 224 in the study took a director's status as a financial
expert into consideration in determining the director's compensation.
Presumably if the companies associated additional duties or risks with the
financial expert, the financial expert consistently would receive additional
cash or equity compensation as a result.
63
It appears that the Final Rule successfully addressed the companies'
concerns about whether the financial experts will be subjected to additional
liability. However, as with the definition of financial expert in the Final
Rule, there was a trade-off in the SEC's decision to explicitly comment on
potential liability under state law. The way the SEC has written the safe
harbor, financial experts are not required to do anything. Investors might
ask, "What is the point of having a financial expert on the audit
committee?"
161. Proposed Rule, supra note 41. The actual "price" of adding a director to serve on
the audit committee is about $55,000 on average, plus stock-based compensation. For the
Russell Microcap companies, the number would be closer to $26,000. Neither is a
significant expense for multi-million dollar companies.
162. See supra text accompanying note 89.
163. As noted earlier, most of the audit committee chairs for the subject companies have
been designated financial experts. Most audit committee chairs receive greater fee
compensation than other board and committee members. However, the filings indicate audit
committee chairs are more highly compensated because of the additional responsibilities
associated with chairing the most prominent board committee, as opposed to their frequent
coterminous designation as financial experts.
[Vol. 2:1
FINANCIAL EXPERT ON THE BOARD
The safe harbor providing that financial experts are not "experts" for
purposes of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 was an understandable
idea. It was never the intent of section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley to elevate
the financial expert to the expertise level of the certified public accountants
directly responsible for preparing and auditing the financial statements.
The financial expert, as a board member, serves in an oversight role.'
64
The SEC went further, though, and provided that financial experts do
not have any duties, obligations or liabilities greater than those imposed on
other members of the audit committee or board. This safe harbor is aimed
primarily at state law fiduciary duty claims, over which the SEC has no
direct authority. Yet the SEC's position is likely to be influential. While
the concern about increased financial expert liability might be legitimate,
state law is well-equipped to handle the responsibilities of directors and
their fiduciary duties to investors. 165 The financial experts might argue that
potential liability stifles creativity, but in the current corporate
environment, investors are likely happy to curtail creativity with respect to
financial reporting.
If the financial expert has no duties, obligations or liabilities greater
than that of the other audit committee members, then investors can take
little additional comfort in having a financial expert involved. Since the
1970s, ordinary audit committee members have been required under
exchange rules to be financially literate, with at least one member having
accounting or related financial management expertise.166 With a statement
in the Final Rule that the financial expert's duties, obligations and
liabilities are no greater than that of the other audit committee members,
section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley adds nothing to the investor protection
164. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 (1994).
165. Investors also want the financial expert to have sufficient incentive to actually use
the experience that qualifies the person for the role in the first place. State law often
protects directors from personal liability for fiduciary duty claims, and most companies have
directors and officers insurance. Accordingly, liability may not be a motivating factor in
director decision making and oversight. However, even if the financial expert would not
ultimately be out-of-pocket for damages, she might find herself embroiled in a greater
number of lawsuits. The intangibles-personal loss of reputation, bad press, litigation costs
to the company, potential adverse effect on stock price, time extended and the trauma of
litigation-would still serve as deterrents to poor oversight of the financial reporting process.
166. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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landscape. 67 The designation of a financial expert appears to be nothing
more than a public relations move to quell investor fears.'
68
The SEC should amend the safe harbor to delete part two of the
provision, which addresses the duties, obligations and liability of the
financial expert in relation to other board members and audit committee
members. 69 It should retain the portions of the safe harbor protecting
financial experts from liability as an "expert" under federal securities law
and making it clear that other board and committee members do not have
altered duties, obligations or liability as the result of having a financial
expert on the audit committee. 70
Such an amendment would leave the liability of a financial expert
where it belongs: in the state courts under long-established fiduciary duty
principles. Those principles are well-equipped to deal with the oversight
role of board and committee members. And while the specter of liability
for a breach of fiduciary duty is no longer what it used to be, it might
provide some additional incentive for a financial expert to be attentive to
his or her duties. '
7
'
In addition, such an amendment would eliminate the SEC's statement
that a financial expert has no additional "duties [or] obligations" beyond
that of an ordinary member of the audit committee or the board. 72 The
SEC has effectively taken away the very purpose of designating a financial
expert in the first place: to provide an additional layer of oversight of
financial reporting and additional protection of investors. If the financial
expert has nothing special to do, then nothing has been accomplished by
designating a financial expert, except that investors will have received a
tonic to mask the real illness.
167. In fact, it may subtract, since the NYSE, AMEX and NASD all say that qualifying as
a financial expert under the Final Rule satisfies the financial experience requirements under
their own rules. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
168. The language included in the few disclaimers is illustrative. See supra text
accompanying note 124 ("Shareholders should understand this designation is an SEC
disclosure requirement .... ). To paraphrase, the SEC is making the company disclose the
designation, but it has no practical effect.
169. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(4)(ii) (2005).
170. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401(h)(4)(i), 229.401(h)(4)(iii) (2005).
171. See supra note 165.
172. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(4)(ii) (2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley recognizing that investor confidence
was waning due to the malfeasance of numerous corporate executives and
individuals at public accounting firms.173 One of the measures designed to
improve investor confidence was section 407, requiring disclosure of
whether a company had a financial expert on its audit committee.
174
Presumably, Congress did not intend to achieve investor confidence by
providing investors with only an illusion of protection. Yet that is exactly
what the SEC's Final Rule implementing section 407 does. Investors
believe they have a true expert on the audit committee, who will use his or
her special expertise to oversee the financial reporting process. Instead,
investors may have a professor of engineering who does not have "any
duties, obligations or liability that are greater than the duties, obligations
and liability imposed on ... member[s] of the audit committee and the
board of directors .... ,,175
If the SEC wants the audit committee financial expert to help restore
investor confidence in financial reporting, as Congress intended, then it
needs to tighten the definition of "audit committee financial expert" by
closing the back door that permits "other relevant experience"'176 as a means
to achieving the required attributes. The SEC also ought to require that a
financial expert's experience be related to an Exchange Act reporting
company, and ought to require companies to justify the financial expert's
qualifications in its proxy statement disclosure. Finally, the SEC ought to
eliminate its statement that audit committee financial experts have no
duties, liabilities or obligations beyond that of an ordinary board or audit
committee member, because that statement strips the financial expert of
any requirement to put his or her expertise to work for investors.
As the Final Rule stands, the only investors who have regained their
confidence in public company financial reporting as a result of section 407
are those who are willing to hear the good news that there is an audit
committee financial expert on board, without paying heed to the bad news
173. Proposed Rule, supra note 41.
174. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
175. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(4)(ii) (2005); See Maxim Integrated
Products, Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy Statement (filed Oct. 18, 2004), (information
obtained using the SEC's "Edgar Search System," at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/company search.html).
176. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3)(iv) (2005).
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that the financial expert may be less qualified than expected and has no
special responsibility to apply any financial expertise to the oversight of the
financial reporting process.
